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Abstract
This paper is based upon the assumption that a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability is determined by
its degree of diversiﬁcation which is, in turn, strongly related to the antecedent deci-
sion to carry out diversiﬁcation activities. This calls for an empirical approach that
permits the joint analysis of the three interrelated and consecutive stages of the over-
all diversiﬁcation process: diversiﬁcation decision, degree of diversiﬁcation and out-
come of diversiﬁcation. We apply parametric and semi-parametric approaches to
control for sample selection and the endogeneity of the diversiﬁcation decision in
both static and dynamic models. For the analysis, we use the census dataset on the
whole ﬁrm population in Vietnam, as a representative of transition countries. After
controlling for industry ﬁxed-effects, the empirical evidence from the ﬁrm-level data
shows that diversiﬁcation has a curvilinear effect on proﬁtability: it improves ﬁrms’
proﬁt up to a point, after which a further increase in diversiﬁcation is associated
with declining performance. This implies that ﬁrms should consider optimal levels
of product diversiﬁcation when they expand their product offerings beyond their
core business. Other noteworthy ﬁndings include the following: (i) the factors that
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stimulate ﬁrms to diversify do not necessarily encourage them to extend their diver-
siﬁcation strategy; (ii) ﬁrms that are endowed with highly technological resources
and innovation investment are likely to successfully exploit diversiﬁcation as an
engine of growth; and (iii) while industry performance does not have a strong inﬂu-
ence on the proﬁtability of ﬁrms, it impacts their diversiﬁcation decision as well as
the degree of diversiﬁcation.
JEL classiﬁcations: L21, L25, C14, C23.
Keywords: Diversiﬁcation, ﬁrm performance, panel data, sample selection, para-
metric and semi-parametric models.
1. Introduction
What determines the optimal boundaries of the ﬁrm across industries? How does a
ﬁrm expand from its core business into other product markets? These questions
have raised substantial research interests, starting with the initial landmark article
‘The Nature of the Firm’ by Coase (1937) and the book The Theory of the Growth of the
Firm by Penrose (1959). Since then, different theories (the resource-based view,
transaction cost, agency theory, etc.) have been proposed to explain ﬁrm diversiﬁca-
tion (Andrews, 1980; Rumelt, 1974). The early industrial organization literature
argued that no signiﬁcant relationship exists between diversiﬁcation and perfor-
mance, meaning that when entering new markets, existing ﬁrms have no special
advantages (see, e.g., Arnould, 1969; Markham, 1973). Various later studies have
shown that, depending on the degree of relatedness of a ﬁrm’s diversiﬁcation activi-
ties, diversiﬁcation generates multiple outcomes (Palich et al., 2000; Qian, 2002). A
common ﬁnding among these studies is that the diversiﬁcation–performance rela-
tionship is nonlinear: they are positively related up to a point, after which a further
increase in diversiﬁcation is associated with declining performance.
Notwithstanding this change of perspective, research has focused primarily on
the single causal effect of degree of diversiﬁcation relatedness on ﬁrms’ subsequent
performance and has neglected the whole diversiﬁcation process in which ﬁrms are
involved until the ﬁnal diversiﬁcation outcome is recognized. The important ques-
tion that is left unanswered is the following: why is it that not all ﬁrms engage in
diversiﬁcation activities or receive equally positive outcomes from their diversiﬁca-
tion strategies? An exploration of the antecedent factors that determine a ﬁrm’s like-
lihood to diversify, as well as how much it can diversify upon its green-light
decision, might lead to an answer.
First, we argue that it may not be appropriate to analyze the diversiﬁcation–
performance relationship in a single-equation framework, because it is strongly
related to the predetermined factors that induce ﬁrms to engage in diversiﬁcation.
Thus, we investigate the whole process in three interrelated and consecutive stages:
diversiﬁcation decision (what factors inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s decision to diversify?);
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diversiﬁcation degree (once a ﬁrm decides to diversify, what determines the degree
of its diversiﬁcation relatedness?); and diversiﬁcation outcome (how does a ﬁrm’s
diversiﬁcation degree inﬂuence its proﬁtability?). The ﬁrst two equations are by nat-
ure interrelated (only after the ﬁrm decides to diversify, can we observe the ﬁrm’s
degree of relatedness to its core business); therefore we take into consideration that
their disturbances are correlated.
Second, we are aware that ANOVAs or cross-sectional least-squares regressions
are inadequate to study the relationship between diversiﬁcation and performance,
because these methodological approaches treat the decision to diversify exo-
genously. Consistent with Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) and Lang and Stulz
(1994) among others, who show that ﬁrm and industry characteristics inﬂuence a
ﬁrm’s decision to diversify – that is, that diversiﬁcation decisions are endogenous,
we take into account the sample selection and endogeneity issues by applying para-
metric and semi-parametric estimation methods for both static and dynamic treat-
ments of ﬁrm-level panel data. Initially, sample selection will be tested and
corrected for the ﬁrst two stages. Four different estimation approaches are employed
for the robustness check of the results: the standard Heckman’s two-stage method,
the Vella–Wooldridge parametric approach, the Heckman kernel-based propensity
score matching, and the Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) procedure. Then, to con-
trol for the endogeneity of diversiﬁcation degree (given their diversiﬁcation decision
and diversiﬁcation degree choice), we apply the Blundell–Bond linear dynamic
GMM estimation approach for the static and dynamic treatments.
Apart from the novelty of investigating the diversiﬁcation/performance relation-
ship in a comprehensive three-stage process and controlling for selectivity and
endogeneity issues, this research also contributes as a pioneer in studying the diver-
siﬁcation activities of ﬁrms in a transition country such as Vietnam. Although the
nature of diversiﬁcation activities in developing countries seems to differ fundamen-
tally from that in developed countries (Nachum, 1999), we argue that diversiﬁcation
can also be a growth strategy for ﬁrms in transition countries, irrespective of
whether they were previously state-owned or fully private (Loc et al., 2006).
The dataset used for the empirical analysis is from the annual enterprise survey
conducted by the Vietnam General Statistics Ofﬁce (GSO). It allows us to take into
account a period in which the reform that was implemented during the 1990s
started to have effects (Sakellariou and Fang, 2014). In fact, the database covers the
entire population of existing ﬁrms from 2002 to 2010 which is more than one million
observations. The 2002–2010 period represents a typical transition in the Vietnamese
economy, with some remarkable milestones that are critical for economic perfor-
mance at both the macro- and micro-levels. Vietnam’s trade liberalization with the
US in 2001 and its entrance into the WTO in 2007 are noteworthy. However, due to
the high churning rate of ﬁrms and to trace their diversiﬁcation activities and perfor-
mance over time, we extract a balanced panel of 26,289 non-agricultural ﬁrms estab-
lished before 2002 and still existing in 2010 (236,601 observations). For the survival
bias analysis of the diversiﬁed ﬁrms, the whole unbalanced panel dataset is used.
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Controlling for individual-level, ﬁrm-level and industry-level characteristics, we
ﬁnd that the factors stimulating ﬁrms to undertake diversiﬁcation decisions do not
necessarily inﬂuence their degree of diversiﬁcation in the same direction and to the
same magnitude. The main ﬁndings are as follows: (i) diversiﬁcation has a curvilin-
ear effect on ﬁrm-level proﬁtability, because product diversiﬁcation improves ﬁrms’
proﬁt up to a point, after which a further increase in diversiﬁcation is associated
with declining performance; (ii) while the impact of technical employees on the
ﬁrm’s diversiﬁcation activities is controversial, innovation intensity stimulates ﬁrms
to diversify and to take the stable and safe-related pathway (both of these factors
are positively associated with ﬁrm performance); (iii) ﬁrms with higher debt ratios
are less diversiﬁed, but once they diversify, they are more likely to adopt risky unre-
lated options and thus have lower proﬁtability; (iv) less diversiﬁed ﬁrms spend
more on, and beneﬁt more from, marketing investment, and marketing-intensive
ﬁrms are generally more focused on their main business ﬁeld; (v) newer and larger
ﬁrms are more likely to engage in diversiﬁcation; (vi) industry-level characteristics,
including low proﬁtability, high concentration and maturity signiﬁcantly stimulate
ﬁrms to diversify into other business sectors and have a signiﬁcant impact on their
overall performance.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the theoretical discus-
sion of product diversiﬁcation and its relationship with the performance of ﬁrms;
Section 3 gives an overview of the dataset and presents the variables adopted
together with their descriptive statistics and correlation matrix; Section 4 develops
the approach(es) that we apply to obtain the ﬁnal empirical estimation after con-
ducting relevant tests for the existence of sample selection and endogeneity; Sec-
tion 5 discusses the estimation results. Section 6 controls for the potential survival
bias of our estimation; and, ﬁnally, Section 7 offers some concluding remarks and
directions for future research.
2. Literature survey
Numerous researchers have proposed various deﬁnitions and measures of product
diversiﬁcation. For example, Ansoff (1965) focused on entry into new markets with
new products; Kamien and Schwartz (1975) emphasized a ﬁrm’s degree of product
and market involvement; and Rumelt (1974) and other scholars2 focused on the
strategy of adding related or similar product/service lines to existing core business
either through the acquisition of competitors or through the internal development of
new products/services, which implies an increase in managerial competence within
the ﬁrm.
Diversiﬁcation is, thus, a matter of degree of relatedness among the activities car-
ried out by a ﬁrm. Product relatedness denotes the extent to which a ﬁrm’s different
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lines of business are linked by a common skill, market, purpose, or resource (Luo,
2002; Rumelt, 1974): for instance, using the same types and proportions of human
expertise (Farjoun, 1994) or relying on the same inﬂows of technology (Robins and
Wiersema, 1995). Empirical studies normally measure diversiﬁcation as the number
of activities a ﬁrm undertakes in different sectors. Such studies thus characterize
resources at the industry level only, thereby failing to address the heterogeneity of
ﬁrm-level resource bases. The degree of relatedness is then measured with reference
to the system of standard industrial classiﬁcation (SIC) codes. While this type of
measure has inherent limitations due to not taking into account the internal manage-
rial effort or resource requirements underlying observable diversiﬁcation activities
and relying on proximity among SIC codes (Silverman, 1999), it has been commonly
applied in empirical parts of this work due to its availability and straightforward
nature.
Montgomery (1994) distinguishes between three motivations for diversiﬁcation.
First, the market-power view postulates that diversiﬁed ﬁrms will thrive at the
expense of non-diversiﬁed ﬁrms not because they are more efﬁcient but because
they have access to ‘conglomerate power’ (Montgomery, 1994, p. 165). Under the
market power search approach, the diversiﬁcation strategies undertaken by growth-
oriented managers may well exploit scope economies and simultaneously increase
ﬁrms’ market power. An efﬁcient way to increase ﬁrms’ market power is the multi-
market contact hypothesis (Scott, 1993), according to which ﬁrms meeting in several
markets have a greater incentive to network with each other to sustain their collec-
tive power. Conversely, multiproduct ﬁrms can create positive spillovers by cross-
subsidization activities that is, the market strength and value of the resources in one
particular industry may increase due to investment in another industry (Foss and
Christensen, 2001; Teece et al., 1994).
Second, the resource view argues that rent-seeking ﬁrms diversify in response to
excess capacity in productive resources. In this sense, a ﬁrm’s level of proﬁt and the
breadth of its diversiﬁcation are functions of its resource stock (Montgomery, 1994,
p. 167). The deployment of surplus resources and free cash ﬂows is one of the prime
motives for diversiﬁcation (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). However, the asset speciﬁcity
embedded in ﬁrms’ resources on the one hand creates sustainable competitive
power for the owner relative to the competitors, but on the other hand, it is a chal-
lenge that impedes the ﬁrm’s ability to transfer resources to new applications or
transplant them into a new context (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988). Therefore,
the value of diversiﬁcation will depend on the complementarities that exist between
the internal resources and the business/industry that the ﬁrm enters, as well as the
diversiﬁcation mode that it chooses. This opens the way for several empirical pre-
dictions revolving around the relatedness of diversiﬁcation activities: the more clo-
sely these activities are related or complementary, the more proﬁtable the
diversiﬁcation is expected to be.
Third, the agency view emphasizes the beneﬁts a ﬁrm’s managers may reap at
the expense of its shareholders (Montgomery, 1994, p. 166). Considering
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diversiﬁcation in large ﬁrms as being a result of the separation between ownership
and control, the agency approach predicts a negative relationship between diversiﬁ-
cation and ﬁrm performance. Hoskisson and Hitt (1990) suggest that diversiﬁcation,
ﬁrm size and executive compensation are highly correlated to the extent to which
diversiﬁcation provides beneﬁts to managers who are unavailable to investors.
Diversiﬁcation can also lead to the problem of moral hazard due to a conﬂict of
interest between managers who have an interest in costly diversiﬁcation as a form
of compenzation and investors who prefer to concentrate on the core business to
maximise their returns (Bhide, 1990).
Finally, focusing on the distribution of the ﬁrm’s activities over industries, trans-
action cost economists suggest that diversiﬁcation is an alternative contractual
method by which a ﬁrm can exploit its surplus resources (Silverman, 1999). By the
same token, Grossmann (2007) submits that diversiﬁcation may be a means to
expand the ﬁrm’s boundaries in the presence of the internal coordination problems
that naturally arise in large ﬁrms. However, no matter how business activities are
related, the transfer of product and process technology among different industries
with varied characteristics normally requires certain modiﬁcation and adjustment,
thereby incurring varying degrees of transaction costs (Qian, 2002). When a ﬁrm
moves into a market with only a weak connection to its primary line of business (un-
related diversiﬁcation), it often lacks the know-how and managerial resources to
prevail against the competition in this new industry. Diversiﬁcation beyond a cer-
tain degree raises internal governance and administration costs to the point that per-
formance suffers (Jones and Hill, 1988). Thus, many of the most signiﬁcant failures
of diversiﬁcation can be traced to the failure of achieving sufﬁcient relatedness
between business sectors, which implies that the resources in one industry are sub-
stitutes for, or complements to, the resources in another industry (Lien and Klein,
2006).
Empirically, diversiﬁcation is normally approached by focusing either on the
synergies exploited by diversiﬁed ﬁrms and the optimal organizational structure for
managing a multiproduct ﬁrm (strategic management approach) or on the relation-
ships between market/industry structure and ﬁrm-level diversiﬁcation (industrial
organization approach). In each discipline, the empirical literature has grown with
scarce contacts with the other one (Vannoni, 2004).
Within the strategic management approach, despite being based on various sets
of management guidelines that address the question of the appropriate scale and
scope of the ﬁrm, corporate strategies converge in dealing with the conﬂicting
demands of synergies and responsiveness with respect to allocating resources (Wit
and Meyer, 2005). On the one hand, the synergy of interrelated businesses within a
diversiﬁed ﬁrm brings the beneﬁt of economies of scope, which arise from sharing
common tangible inputs, such as markets, distribution systems, product and process
technologies and manufacturing facilities (Rumelt, 1974; Teece, 1980), as well as
intangible assets such as brand names and know-how (Qian, 1997), managerial
capabilities, routines and repertoires (Grant, 1988). The more interrelated the
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businesses, the greater the potential for organizational synergy (Salter and Wein-
hold, 1981). On the other hand, synergy has harmful effects owing to responsive-
ness, such as higher governance costs, slower decision making, strategy
incongruence, dysfunctional control and dulled incentives (Wit and Meyer, 2005).
Thus, the fundamental challenge facing corporate diversiﬁcation stems from
‘managing the conﬂict between the new and old (business activities) and overcom-
ing the inevitable tensions that such conﬂict produces for management’ (Dess et al.,
2003, p. 358).
With respect to the industrial organization approach, diversiﬁcation as the proxy
for economies of scope is investigated in relation to ﬁrms’ innovative capabilities.
Firms are assumed to have different innovative capabilities that lead them to pursue
different types of product diversiﬁcation (Cohen and Klepper, 1992). A ﬁrm with a
diversiﬁed portfolio of products may be better positioned to determine the general
applicability of new ideas than a ﬁrm with a narrower portfolio of products; this is
because the former is able to capture internal knowledge spillovers. Indeed, ﬁrms
that sell only one category of products are less likely to engage in R&D than those
that sell a broader range of products (Piga and Vivarelli, 2004). Given the same com-
petencies for the production and delivery of core products, together with the same
incentives to diversify, ﬁrms that possess more dynamic capabilities will be more
likely to expand their product scope (Doving and Gooderham, 2008).
Regardless of which disciplinary and theoretical perspective one adopts, most
studies support a curvilinear relationship between diversiﬁcation and proﬁtability
(for a review, see Palich et al., 2000; see also Yigit and Berham, 2013). The appropri-
ateness of product diversity is judged by the balance between (positive) synergy
effect and (negative) responsiveness effect, as well as the balance between econo-
mies of scope and diseconomies of scale, which indicates a limit on how much a ﬁrm
can diversify. If a ﬁrm goes beyond this point, its market value suffers (Markides,
1992). However, we cannot explain the extent to which the positive effect of synergy
fades away and is replaced by the negative effect of responsiveness or why moder-
ate levels of diversiﬁcation yield higher levels of performance than either limited or
extensive diversiﬁcation (Tran and Zaninotto, 2012). Why is it that not all ﬁrms
engage in diversiﬁcation activities or receive equally positive outcomes from their
diversiﬁcation strategies? This can be partly explained by different motives that
determines ﬁrms’ engagement with diversiﬁcation: the efﬁciency motive or
bounded-rational herding behaviour (Tran et al., 2015). The exploration of the ante-
cedent factors that determine a ﬁrm’s likelihood of diversifying, as well as how
much it can diversify upon its green-light decision, might lead to an answer.
3. Data description and definition of variables
The dataset used for the empirical analysis is the annual enterprise survey
database conducted by the GSO from 2002 to 2010. It covers the entire
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population of existing ﬁrms over 9 years, which comprises more than one mil-
lion observations. The GSO survey is comprehensive and harmonized across
provinces and industries to obtain a coherent view of various aspects of ﬁrms,
including segment data (ISIC code, industry sales, size and assets), accounting
data (debt, revenue, proﬁt), basic demographic data (year of inception, owner-
ship type, size of labour force), and innovation data. However, due to the high
churning rate of ﬁrms, and because we want to trace the diversiﬁcation activi-
ties and performance of ﬁrms over time, we extract the balanced panel of
26,289 non-agricultural ﬁrms that were established before 2002 and were still
in existence until 2010 (236,601 observations) for the empirical evidence of the
three-staged diversiﬁcation process. To control for the potential survival bias of
diversiﬁed ﬁrms, the entire population of ﬁrms will be used.
Following is the list of variables we use in this paper. The choice of vari-
ables is based on the different theoretical foundations reviewed above. The
industrial organization literature focusing on the relationship between ﬁrm per-
formance and a host of industry structure variables suggests the list of our
industry-level variables: industry concentration, industry growth/proﬁtability,
industry lifecycle, and so on. The market power theory states that ﬁrms diver-
sify to reduce industry competition and concentration; its prescriptions can,
therefore, be tested by means of an industry concentration variable. The
resource-based or capability-based view explains the determinants of diversiﬁca-
tion and ﬁrm performance from the excess of various ﬁrm resources: human
resources (labour size of the ﬁrm), ﬁnancial/physical resources (economic size,
capital intensity of the ﬁrm), marketing and R&D resources (Montgomery and
Hariharan, 1991) (marketing expenditure, technological resources and innova-
tion intensity). The agency theory proposes that the combination of ownership
structure, risk and resource availability affects the direction of diversiﬁcation
and can, therefore, be tested by including debt ratio and ownership type vari-
ables in the analysis.
3.1 Firm performance
In this paper, we adopt two measures of ﬁrm performance: which are return on
sales (ROS) and growth of sales. ROS indicates how net income is earned from each
thousand Vietnamese dong (VND) of total sales. It is the ratio between after-tax
proﬁts and total annual sales. The rationale for using ROS, rather than the widely
used logarithm of proﬁt or ROA (return on assets) is as follows: the logarithm of
proﬁt excludes ﬁrms operating at loss (negative proﬁt) from the analysis, whereas
assets would carry book values and require a longer time frame of availability. For
growth of sales, we use an adjusted measure SalestSalest11=2ðSalestþSalest1Þ. Since our sales growth
exhibits high dispersion, the advantage of this measure is the symmetry around zero
and the boundedness between 2 and 2.
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3.2 Product diversiﬁcation index
In this paper, we measure diversiﬁcation by the entropy index, the most common
and robust of all ﬁve properties of a diversiﬁcation index (Gollop and Monahan,
1991). Entropy ¼Pnt Si lnð1=SiÞ where Si is the share of segment i in the ﬁrm’s sales,
and ln (1/Si) is the weight for each segment i. The segment information from the
ISIC codes is used to construct it. The index is sensitive to changes in the number
and distribution of products: it is bounded below by zero (0 ≤ E < ln(n)). As the
number of products increases, the entropy index increases at a decreasing rate; how-
ever, as the distribution of products becomes more equal, it increases at an increas-
ing rate. The index is 0 when the ﬁrm produces in only one industry and is equal to
ln (n) in cases in which the sales are equally distributed among n industries.
3.3 Probability of diversiﬁcation
A dummy is adopted as the dependent variable in Equation (1) to distinguish single
business ﬁrms from diversiﬁed ﬁrms. It attains 1 if ﬁrms have their business opera-
tions in more than one industry (one main industry and other subsidiary ones) and
0 otherwise.3
3.4 Control variables
We introduce two categories of control variables: (i) ﬁrm level: ﬁrm size, age, capital
intensity, debt ratio, marketing expenditure, level of competition, technological
resources, innovation intensity, and whether the ﬁrm exports its products/services;
and (ii) industry-level proﬁtability proxied by average industry ROS, industry life
cycle proxied by industry size dispersion and industry concentration. The 1-year
lagged values of selected variables – such as debt ratio, marketing expenditure,
export, technological resources and innovation intensity – will be used instead in
order to prevent their potential endogeneity.
3.4.1 Innovation intensity
This is measured as the proportion of innovation investment4 in the total annual
investment. It is expressed in decimal points and, thus, has values between 0 and 1.
We allow for a nonlinear relationship by including squared innovation intensity.
3 Here the cut-off threshold c separates ﬁrms operating in only one industry (i.e., reporting ISIC code in only
the main industry column) from those operating in more than one industry (i.e., reporting ISIC code in both
the main industry and industry 1 column). This binary variable can capture the dynamics or trend of diversiﬁ-
cation of ﬁrms over time as well. Firms can enter and exit diversiﬁcation on a yearly basis: therefore, the
threshold cwill attain the values 1 and 0, respectively. We restrict our analysis to non-agricultural ﬁrms only.
4 In this paper, innovation investment includes three components: (i) construction and assembly work; (ii)
machinery and equipment; and (iii) technology renovation. It is therefore largely a measure of technological
change embodied in intermediate and capital goods, which has been shown to be a major determinant of the
overall innovation activities of SMEs (Santarelli and Sterlacchini, 1990).
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The innovation process is likely to increase the ﬁrm’s external absorptive capacity
(Levinthal, 1996) and internal knowledge base, leading to greater ﬂexibility and
adaptability in new industries.
3.4.2 Technological resources
Grossmann (2007) indicates that technological resources are the driving forces
behind a positive relationship between product diversiﬁcation and ﬁrm perfor-
mance. It has been widely recognized that these may be measured through indica-
tors of R&D inputs, R&D processes and R&D outputs (for a review, see Audretsch,
1995). One crucial indicator of R&D inputs, the share of R&D employees over the
total labour force, could be used as a proxy for technological resources. However,
on the one hand, it is likely that technical employees with specialized knowledge
may be less willing to absorb new knowledge. On the other hand, specialized work-
ers might be productive whenever the ﬁrm invests enough in innovation activities.
Thus, we will also consider the effect of the interaction term between innovation
intensity and technological resources.
3.4.3 Firm size
This is measured in relation to both economic size and labour size. Economic size is
taken as the natural logarithm of total ﬁrm assets. Labour size is measured as the
natural logarithm of the total number of employees. Quadratic terms are also added
to establish a nonlinear relationship between ﬁrm size and performance. The loga-
rithm transformation was used because size is highly skewed, and extreme values
strongly affect correlations with other variables. Firm size is normally used as a
proxy for competitive position and ﬁrms’ advantage within an industry (Johnson
et al., 1997).
3.4.4 Firm age
This is related to the level of experience, learning and managerial competencies that
a ﬁrm accumulates. The age effect on ﬁrm performance is inconclusive and contro-
versial, depending on the speciﬁc environment and industry in which the ﬁrm oper-
ates. In view of the dynamic features of an emerging market, aging may impede the
ability of a ﬁrm to be alert and to capture proﬁt opportunities in a timely and efﬁ-
cient manner. The effect of ﬁrm age is explored by means of the number of years
that the ﬁrm has been in continuous operation.
3.4.5 Capital intensity
Due to the nature of technology, some ﬁrms are more capital-intensive than others.
Within any particular industry, a ﬁrm may choose a highly automated process or a
more labour-intensive one. As Porter (1976) states, the capital intensity in the form
of industry-speciﬁc assets acts as a barrier to exit. In general, capital intensity
imposes a greater degree of risk, because assets are frozen in long-lived forms that
may not be easy to sell. Given that return (and risk) varies with capital intensity, the
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differences in proﬁtability are likely to be associated with capital intensity between
diversiﬁed and undiversiﬁed ﬁrms. As Shepherd (1979) notes, there are several
ways to measure capital intensity, and all show similar patterns. The present study
uses the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total number of employees.
3.4.6 Debt ratio
The ﬁnance literature indicates that the leverage situation of ﬁrms strongly inﬂu-
ences their value. On the one hand, Opler and Titman (1994) ﬁnd that highly lever-
aged ﬁrms lose a substantial market share to their more conservatively ﬁnanced
competitors. On the other hand, diversiﬁcation can improve debt capacity, thereby
reducing the chances of bankruptcy by going into new products/markets (Higgins
and Schall, 1975) and improving asset deployment and proﬁtability (Teece, 1982).
Thus, the 1-year lagged debt ratio, measured as the ratio of total debts to total assets
in the previous year, is adopted to isolate the effect of a ﬁrm’s leverage capacity on
its diversiﬁcation/performance.
3.4.7 Marketing expenditure
When a ﬁrm enters a new market, it might need to spend resources to acquire a
stock of new customers. Corporate marketing activities reﬂect the organization’s
vision and distinctive competencies to enhance awareness and provide uniﬁed sup-
port for its products. Economic intuition suggests that the beneﬁts of corporate mar-
keting are likely to be higher for ﬁrms that are less diversiﬁed and that such ﬁrms
should, therefore, spend more on marketing (Raju and Dhar, 1999). Given the
importance of corporate marketing strategy in explaining the dependent variables
of interest, we will consider the effect of marketing expenditure on the ﬁrm’s degree
of diversiﬁcation and its entrepreneurial performance.
3.4.8 Level of competition
In times of uncertainty, companies economise on search costs and therefore imitate
the actions of other successful ﬁrms. This increases the complexity and uncertainty
caused by ﬁrm-level competition within its 4-digit ISIC industry. Thus, the level of
competition that the ﬁrm is facing might be correlated with diversiﬁcation degree,
ﬁrm performance, and more importantly, the proposed instruments. Including ﬁrm-
level ﬁxed effects does not solve this problem, because the competition level is time
variant. Following Bloom et al. (2013), we will construct a proxy of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
competition level.5
5 Let the amount of ﬁrms in the sample be N. Deﬁne the vector Si = (Si1, Si2, . . ., SiN) where Sin is the average
share of sales of ﬁrm i in the four digit industry n across all years in the sample. The product market closeness
index for ﬁrms i and j is calculated as SICij ¼ SiS
0
i
ðSiS0iÞ1=2ðSjS0 jÞ1=2
. This index is bounded below by zero and above by
one, based on the overlap of product lines between ﬁrms. Finally, the competition level for ﬁrm i at time t can
be deﬁned as COMPit = ∑j6¼iSICijSalejt, where Salejt is the total sales of ﬁrm j at time t.
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3.4.9 Average industry profitability
We include observations across multiple industries; therefore, it is essential to con-
sider industry average level performance. One motive for ﬁrms’ diversiﬁcation is
when their core business has matured or started to decline or when they want to
reduce cyclical ﬂuctuations in sales. Their diversiﬁcation will be in the direction of
those emerging industries with increasing proﬁtable opportunities. The prevailing
approaches to measure industry-level performance are to include either the indus-
try average level of a particular performance measure (ROA, ROS, proﬁt, etc.) or
industry dummy variables (Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005). The latter
approach reduces the statistical power of the model due to a signiﬁcant increase in
variables (Sharp et al., 2013); therefore, this paper uses the average ROS of all ﬁrms
in the 4-digit industry as the proxy for industry proﬁtability level.
3.4.10 Industry size dispersion
The effect of industry lifecycle is proxied by the size dispersion of each industry,
which is calculated by the standard deviation of ﬁrm size from the average ﬁrm size.
Small-size standard deviation indicates the dominance and prevalence of large ﬁrms
– that is, the maturity of the industry – whereas large-size standard deviation sug-
gests the prevalence of small ﬁrms and the availability of abundant proﬁtable
opportunities. These opportunities stimulate new entries and indicate the growing
stage of the industry. The transition to a new technology in an industry involves a
shakeout of ﬁrst-generation ﬁrms. As product markets mature, the shakeout
becomes more severe (Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994).
3.4.11 Industry concentration6
Industries with high concentration rates are characterized by scale-intensive ﬁrms.
Scale economies and other sources of market power reduce the threat from potential
entrants, thereby allowing incumbents to raise prices without inviting entry. Such a
relationship was found in inﬂuential studies (such as Montgomery, 1985); but the
relationship between industry concentration and the probability of ﬁrm entry or exit
remains controversial (Schmalensee, 1989). For concentration, we use the market
share of the top four companies in a given industry. This calculation determines
whether an industry is an oligopoly, a monopoly, or neither. Lower ﬁgures indicate
a greater degree of competition, while higher ﬁgures indicate an oligopoly or a
monopoly.
3.4.12 Regional control
Regional factors play an important role and contribute signiﬁcantly to the explana-
tion of new business survival (Fritsch et al., 2006). According to Storey (1994), a
strong correlation exists between local characteristics and ﬁrm growth. Vietnam
6 All industry-level controls (industry proﬁtability, industry size dispersion and industry concentration) were
constructed for the main four-digit industry only.
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currently has 64 provinces; therefore, 64 provincial dummies are included in the
analysis to isolate unobserved heterogeneity across different Vietnamese provinces.
3.4.13 Ownership type
Six dummies – which stand for state-owned ﬁrms, partnership and cooperatives,
private ﬁrms, limited liability ﬁrms, joint stock ﬁrms, and foreign-invested ﬁrms –
are also included to control for the impact of legal ownership type on ﬁrms’ diversi-
ﬁcation activities and entrepreneurial performance.
Appendix A lists and summarizes the descriptive statistics of all adopted vari-
ables. Appendix B presents the pair-wise correlation matrix of the dependent vari-
able and independent variables. We can see from the correlation matrix that, out of
136 pair-wise correlations, 68 are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent signiﬁcant
level. However, most are not numerically substantive, with correlation coefﬁcients
below 0.3. The only pair-wise correlation that is greater than 0.3 is the one between
economic size and labour size (0.736).
4. Estimation model
We analyze ﬁrm diversiﬁcation strategies and performance in three stages: (i) deci-
sion, (ii) degree, (iii) outcome. We control for sample selection bias in the ﬁrst two
stages. As pointed out by Campa and Kedia (2002) and Lang and Stulz (1994), poor
performers diversify in search of growth opportunities because they have exhausted
such opportunities in their existing activities. The endogeneity of diversiﬁcation
degree is controlled in the third stage to account for ﬁrm-level characteristics that
inﬂuence both ﬁrms’ diversiﬁcation decision/degree and ﬁrm values. Conversely, it
is plausible to assume that it takes some time for the pay-off of ﬁrms’ diversiﬁcation
to be recognized. We adopt the dynamic model in which the lagged-dependent vari-
able is included to isolate the effect of time lag on performance and potential perfor-
mance shock.
4.1 Diversiﬁcation equation
The selection equation can be speciﬁed as follows:
DIit ¼ 1 if DI

it ¼ wit1a1 þ eit1[c
0 if DIit ¼ wit1a1 þ eit1c

ð1Þ
where DIit is an observable indicator that takes the value 1 if ﬁrm i diversiﬁes in year
t, and 0 otherwise; DIit is a latent variable reﬂecting the ﬁrm’s diversiﬁcation effort
such that ﬁrm i decides to diversify if it is above a given threshold c, wit1 is a set of
explanatory variables affecting the ﬁrm’s decision to diversify, and eit1 is the error
term.
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Once the ﬁrm decides to diversify, the next decision point is the degree of diver-
siﬁcation –that is the extent to which the new products / services are unrelated to
the core product portfolio of the ﬁrm:
Entropyit ¼ DI

it ¼ wit2a2 þ eit2 if DIit ¼ 1
0 if DIit ¼ 0

ð2Þ
where wit2 is a set of determinants of the degree of relatedness of the ﬁrm’s diversiﬁ-
cation. Under the selection rule described by Equations (1) and (2), we have:
EðEntropyitnwit1;wit2;DIit[ 0Þ ¼ wit2a2 þ Eðeit2neit1[c wit1a1;wit1;wit2Þ: ð3Þ
The least-squares method of regressing Entropy on w2 is an inconsistent esti-
mator of a2 if the second term on the right side of Equation (3) is non-zero. If
we are willing to assume that error terms in both Equations (1) and (2) are N
(0, ∞), the standard Heckman (1979) two-stage method provides consistent esti-
mators. However, in many empirical problems, the distribution of the errors is
not known or is subject to heteroscedasticity of an unknown form. In such
cases, the maximum likelihood estimator will not provide a consistent estimate.
In addition, for censored panel data with ﬁxed effects, the maximum likelihood
estimation methods will generally be inconsistent even when the parametric
form of the conditional error distribution is correctly speciﬁed (Honore, 1992).
Thus, it is important to develop estimation methods that provide consistent
estimates for the sample selection dataset when the error distribution is non-
normal or heteroscedastic. Vella (1998) and Wooldridge (1995) relax this
assumption and propose alternative two-stage estimation methods that may
have better ﬁnite sample properties.
Under the assumption that (eit1, eit2) are independent of (wit2, wit2), Vella
and Wooldridge note that Eðeit2nwit2;wit2; eit1;DIit[ 0Þ ¼ Eðeit2neit1;DIit[ 0Þ. If
one further assumes that Eðeit2neit1Þ ¼ ceit1, then the selection bias correction
term is ceit1. We can estimate eit1 by ceit1 ¼ DIit  wit1 ba1 , where ba1 is the probit
estimator of a1. Thus we can use eit1, rather than Heckman’s (1979) inverse
Mills ratio, as an additional variable in the conditional expectation. This
method has two advantages relative to the standard Heckman procedure: (i)
when wit2 and the inverse Mills ratio are near collinearity, eit1 has more varia-
tion than wit2, thereby making the Vella–Wooldridge estimator more stable and
thus more efﬁcient (see Wooldridge, 2002); (ii) the method is computationally
less costly, relaxes the strong normality assumption, and is more robust to near
collinearity in the data (Christoﬁdes et al., 2003).
It is plausible to assume that Eðeit2neit1Þ ¼ gðeit1Þ, where g(  ) is an unknown
function. We can easily illustrate that EðEntropyitnwit1;wit2; eit2Þ ¼ wit2a2 þ gðeit2Þ.
Thus we have:
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Entropyit ¼ wit2a2 þ gðeit2Þ þ vit ð4Þ
where vit satisﬁes Eðvitneit1;DIitÞ[ 0Þ ¼ 0. Following Robinson (1988) and using the
data with DIit > 0, from Equation (4) we can get:
Entropyit  EðEntropyitneit1Þ ¼ ½wit2  Eðwit2neit1a2 þ vit: ð5Þ
Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) propose the correction for selection bias that
allows heterogeneously distributed and serially-dependent error terms in both selec-
tion and primary equations. Since the method allows for a rather ﬂexible structure
of the error variance and does not impose any non-standard assumptions on the
conditional distributions of explanatory variables, it provides a useful alternative to
the existing approaches. Assuming the error term (1) as eit2 = ci2 + uit2, and in Equa-
tion (2) as eit2 = ci2 + uit2; ci1 and ci2 are the unobserved ﬁxed effects (maybe corre-
lated with wit2), and uit1, uit2 are idiosyncratic errors. We assume that
Eðuitnwi2; ciÞ 6¼ 0 for some elements of wit2. Further, we assume that ci1 = f(wi1) + ai1,
where f(  ) is a known function, and Eðai1nwi2Þ ¼ 0. Using a more ﬂexible Chamber-
lain’s (1980) speciﬁcation, ci1 ¼ f ðwi1Þ þ ai1 þ wi1h1 þ ai1. Similarly, we also have
ci2 ¼ gðwi2Þ þ ai2 þ wi2h2 þ ai2. This condition is similar to the within transformation
and produces the ﬁxed-effects slope estimators in the balanced panel data. Combin-
ing with (2), we obtain:
Entropyit ¼wit2a2 þ wi2h2 þ ai2 þ uit2
¼wit2a2 þ wi2h2 þ cEðvit2nwi1;DIitÞ þ it
ð6Þ
where vit1  ai1 + uit1, vit2  ai2 + uit2, Eðeitnwi1Þ ¼ 0. With a slight abuse of notation,
for DIit = 1, Equation (6) can be written as:
Entropyit ¼ wit2a2 þ wi2h2 þ ckit þ it: ð7Þ
The propensity score approach has recently been adopted as an efﬁcient method
to address selection bias semi-parametrically (see Shadish et al., 2002 for an over-
view). This paper will follow Heckman et al. (1998) to construct a regression-
adjusted semi-parametric conditional difference-in-differences matching estimator.
In other words, propensity scores take into account all the variables that might play
a role in the selection process and create a predicted probability (i.e., propensity
score) of diversiﬁcation vs. non-diversiﬁcation from a logistic regression equation
and kernel-based matching. These scores can then be used to match diversiﬁcation
and non-diversiﬁcation as a covariate in the main equation. The results from four
estimation approaches – the standard Heckman’s two-stage method, the Vella–
Wooldridge parametric approach, the Semykina and Wooldridge model, and Heck-
man et al.’s kernel-based propensity score matching method – are reported in
Table 1.
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Both the parametric and semi-parametric identiﬁcation of the sample selection
model generally requires an ‘exclusion restriction’. This paper will adopt industry
size dispersion as the exclusion restriction. We believe that ﬁrms residing in a mature
market will be more likely to diversify their production to compensate for proﬁt ero-
sion in their home market. However, the degree of their diversiﬁcation activities will
be more inﬂuenced by their production capacity andmanagerial competences.
The Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) test, which is based on within transforma-
tion that allows the presence of arbitrary correlation between unobserved hetero-
geneity and explanatory variables, indeed indicates the presence of selection bias in
the diversiﬁcation degree equation.7 The exclusion restriction test does support the
relevance and validity of industry size dispersion.8
4.2 Performance equation
The ﬁrm performance equation can be written as follows:
ROSit ¼ ROSit1b1 þ Entropyitb2 þ zitb3 þ vi þ it ði ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n; t ¼ 1; 2; . . .;TÞ
ð8Þ
ROSit1 is the 1-year lagged value of return on investment of ﬁrm i in year t. Entropyit
is the diversiﬁcation index of ﬁrm i. zit is a matrix of control individual-level, ﬁrm-
level and industry-level characteristics. vi is an unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc, time-invari-
ant effect which allows for heterogeneity in the means of the ROSit series across ﬁrms,
and eit is a disturbance term. The disturbances eit are assumed to be independent
across individuals. We also treat the ﬁrm effects vi as stochastic, which implies that
they are necessarily correlated with the lagged-dependent variable ROSit1.
4.2.1 Test for violations of estimation assumptions
Eðitt0 t0Þ ¼ r
2
 i ¼ i0; t ¼ t0 ðH1Þ
0 otherwise ðH2Þ

Test 1. Heteroscedasticity (H1): We apply the likelihood ratio test for heterosce-
dasticity in panel data and ﬁnd the strong existence of heteroscedasticity
in our data.9
7 v2
k^
ð1Þ = 13,066, P-value = 0.000; v2
k^i;yearð8Þ = 67.16, P-value = 0.000.8 Quality test (correlated with diversiﬁcation decision): v2
k^
ð1Þ = 126.2; P-value = 0.000; Bound et al. (1995) par-
tial R2: 0.006; F(1, 236575) = 43.61; P-value = 0.000.
Validity test (exogeneity condition, i.e., uncorrelated with diversiﬁcation intensity): v2(1) = 1.72;
P-value = 0.19; Hansen J statistic: 0.709, P-value = 0.3999.
9 Likelihood ratio test for the presence of heteroscedasticity: v2(210305) = 349,210; P-value = 0.000.
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Test 2. Serial correlation in the time-series data (H2): The Wooldridge test for
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in the panel data is insigniﬁcant even at the 5
percent level, which indicates the absence of ﬁrst-order serial correlation
in the ROS equation.10
Test 3. Endogeneity of the diversiﬁcation index: The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test
does indicate the strong presence of the endogeneity of diversiﬁcation.11
4.2.2 Estimation methods
Several econometric problems may arise from estimating Equation (8): (i) The diver-
siﬁcation index Entropyit is assumed to be endogenous; (ii) time-invariant unob-
served ﬁrm characteristics (ﬁxed effects) vi may be correlated with Entropyit and zit;
(iii) the panel dataset has a short time dimension (T = 9) and a large number of ﬁrms
(n = 26,289) Thus, the presence of the lagged-dependent variable ROSit1 may give
rise to autocorrelation, because it is correlated with ﬁxed effects.
To deal with these problems, we apply the Blundell and Bond (1998) difference
dynamic GMM estimation. Improving upon the work of Arellano and Bond (1991),
Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed a system estimator that uses moment conditions
in which lagged differences are used as instruments for the level equation in addi-
tion to the moment conditions of lagged levels as instruments for the differenced
equation.
By transforming the regressors by ﬁrst differencing, the ﬁxed ﬁrm-speciﬁc effect
is removed, because it does not vary with time:
DROIit1 ¼ b1DROIit þ b2DEntropyit þ b3Dzit þ Dit: ð9Þ
Table 3 shows the estimation results of the performance equation for both ROS
and growth of sales as the dependent variable. According to Baum and Schaffer
(2003), GMM estimation is more efﬁcient than 2SLS when heteroscedasticity is
present.
5. Estimation results and discussion
The estimation results for the diversiﬁcation decisions and diversiﬁcation degrees of
ﬁrms are given in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Table 1 presents four estimation
models: (i) the ﬁrst step probit of Heckman two-step consistent estimates, (ii) the
joint maximum likelihood estimation based on the joint normality of (eit, eit), (iii) the
ﬁrst step of the Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) method, and (iv) the kernel-based
propensity matching method.
10 Test for serial correlation: F(1, 26288) = 1.083; P-value = 0.2979.
11 Durbin–Wu–Hausman test: v2(1) = 25.04; P-value = 0.0000.
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Both the Shapiro-Wilk W and the Shapiro-Francia W test for normality assump-
tion of the error terms in the diversiﬁcation decision equation indicate the rejection
of the null normality hypothesis at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level. Thus, the Heck-
man two-step procedure requiring the normality assumption may not be an efﬁcient
estimation method for our analysis. The signs of the estimated parameters are quite
consistent across different methodological treatments although the statistical
Table 4. Control for survival bias
First stage:
Probability of survival
Second stage:
Proﬁtability of survival
Entropy 1.231** (0.069) 2.214** (0.171)
Entropy squared 1.124** (0.032) 2.321** (0.231)
Technological resources t1 0.394** (0.052) 0.331** (0.064)
Innovation intensity t1 0.187** (0.062) 0.082** (0.007)
Innovation intensity squared t1 0.000 (0.000) 0.000** (0.000)
Innov 9 tech resources t1 0.072** (0.006) 0.001** (0.0004)
Leverage (debt ratio) t1 0.006* (0.003) 0.052** (0.002)
Capital intensity 0.000 (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
Export t1 0.245** (0.023) 0.017 (0.008)
Firm age 0.027** (0.000) 0.001** (0.000)
Economic size 0.214** (0.007) 0.028** (0.003)
Economic size squared 0.002** (0.0005) 0.0003** (0.000)
Labour size 0.086** (0.006) 0.051** (0.002)
Labour size squared 0.017** (0.003) 0.003** (0.000)
Marketing expenditure t1 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000)
Competition level 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Average industry ROS 0.067** (0.018) 0.002** (0.0004)
Industry size dispersion 0.000** (0.000)
Industry concentration 0.152** (0.011) 0.027** (0.002)
Provincial dummies v2(60) = 12,821** v2(60) = 11,032**
Ownership types v2(5) = 723** v2(5) = 1,852**
k^ 1.853** (0.064) 0.321** (0.191)
k^ 9 year dummies v2(8) = 2,437** v2(8) = 1,978.6**
Intercept 1.236** (0.134) 1.312** (0.615)
Likelihood ratio test v2(91) = 340,502.75**
Wald v2(91) = 712,055.9**
No. of observations 1,087,557
Note: **Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level; *signiﬁcant at 5 percent level; standard errors in parentheses.
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signiﬁcance and magnitude seem to be stronger with the coefﬁcients obtained from
the ﬁrst stage of the Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) approach. Since this approach
also accounts for ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects, we interpret our results based on the Semyk-
ina and Wooldridge (2010) approach.
Regarding ﬁrm-level characteristics, signiﬁcant and negative parameters of debt
ratio indicate the absence of the leverage effect of loans on stimulating ﬁrms’ diversi-
ﬁcation activities. Obviously, indebted ﬁrms will be less motivated to enter a new
industry due to high risks of failure. Surprisingly, technological resources act as a bar-
rier to ﬁrms’ entering a new business sector. Technical employees with specialized
knowledge in the core business are less willing to absorb the new knowledge and
skills required for crossing ﬁrms’ business boundaries, which is actually a source of
change resistance in incumbent ﬁrms. However, positive and signiﬁcant innovation
intensity and its interaction with technological resources indicates that specialized
workers might be productive and might be willing to adopt new concepts to pro-
duce different products whenever the ﬁrm invests enough in innovation activities.
Firms with higher innovation investment are more likely to enter new industries.
Exporting ﬁrms are more likely to undertake diversiﬁcation to capture emerging
demands, advanced technology and resources from foreign markets (see Xuan and
Xing, 2008). Diversiﬁed ﬁrms spend signiﬁcantly less on marketing expenditure
than their undiversiﬁed counterparts. Inherently, when ﬁrms remain focused on
their product portfolio, they need to strengthen their marketing efforts to reap the
full beneﬁts of the industry, as well as to explore new market segments for future
diversiﬁcation. These marketing investments will be reduced substantially when
they enter new industries and enjoy emerging proﬁtable opportunities: mainly nec-
essary advertising efforts to increase customers’ awareness regarding the new prod-
ucts and services offered.
As expected, ﬁrms that face more severe competition will have a higher motiva-
tion to diversify and exploit new opportunities in new industries.
With respect to the size and age of ﬁrms, newer ﬁrms with innovative, dynamic
and adaptive capabilities are more willing to take risks regarding the expansion of
their product portfolios rather than remain persistently within their core business.
Larger ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly stronger diversiﬁcation activities than their smaller
counterparts. Finally, the positive effect of industry concentration and the negative
effect of industry size dispersion on ﬁrms’ diversiﬁcation decisions indicate that ﬁrms
residing in mature (highly concentrated) industries and oligopolistic markets that
are characterized by higher concentration ratio and smaller size standard deviation,
face low proﬁtable opportunities: Therefore, these ﬁrms have to search for opportu-
nities in other industries to compensate for loss or poor performance in their core
business. Similarly, ﬁrms in emerging industries with high proﬁt margins will not
be in a hurry to search for diversiﬁcation opportunities.
As far as the estimation results from the diversiﬁcation degree equation (Table 2)
are concerned, we again observe consistency in the general pattern of the results
obtained. We still interpret our results based on the Semykina and Wooldridge
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(2010) model given its ability to control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects. It is worth noting
that the effects of some variables – for instance, technological resources and debt ratio –
in this equation contradict with their effects in the diversiﬁcation decision equation
above. This indicates that the factors stimulating ﬁrms to diversify do not necessar-
ily inﬂuence their diversiﬁcation degree to the same extent and vice versa. Technical
employees with specialized knowledge are less willing to absorb new knowledge,
especially when innovation investments are insufﬁcient. However, once they step
outside of their comfort zones and are willing to adopt new concepts to develop
new products, they will be more likely to tap into their unrelated spheres of knowl-
edge to develop radical innovations (i.e., a higher degree of diversiﬁcation12 ). Simi-
larly, although a leveraging effect does not stimulate ﬁrms to undertake
diversiﬁcation, those that have overcome their change resistance and tolerated fail-
ure risks will increase their involvement in areas that are possibly unrelated to their
current domain of competence and corresponding opportunity set. As expected,
ﬁrms’ economic size and labour size positively stimulate their diversiﬁcation activities.
Firms possessing larger asset pools, including human resources, have more favour-
able conditions for diversiﬁcation into a new industry. Khanna and Palepu (1997)
ﬁnd that large ﬁrms in emerging markets maintain substantial competitive advan-
tage by entering new industries to set up their own self-support systems due to the
low level of support systems in these countries.
Because of the vast market potential and low entry barriers of the new busi-
nesses, the risks of expanding into unrelated markets are relatively low. By moving
quickly, the ﬁrm can also tap the beneﬁt of ‘ﬁrst mover’ advantage.13 However, in
Vietnam, relatedness diversiﬁcation is still their optimal pathway given their abun-
dant but ‘asset speciﬁc’ resources due to the nonlinear (decreasing to scale) effect of
ﬁrm size on their diversiﬁcation intensity.
We also ﬁnd evidence that innovative ﬁrms with higher innovation investments
are more likely to have their diversiﬁcation portfolio of stronger relatedness. Consis-
tent with Raju and Dhar (1999), we ﬁnd that less diversiﬁed ﬁrms spend more on
corporate marketing. Firm-level competition stimulates ﬁrms to undertake diversiﬁ-
cation but to mainly exploit their knowledge pool to explore related market oppor-
tunities. Finally, the negative relationship between industry proﬁtability, industry
concentration and ﬁrms’ degree of diversiﬁcation indicates that ﬁrms may want to
leave their stagnant and mature industry by diversifying into a nearby industry in
which they can capitalize their marketing efforts and knowledge spillovers in a
related ﬁeld of business. Proﬁtable industry conditions increase a company’s
12 A higher degree of diversiﬁcation index (entropy) corresponds to the higher propensity toward unrelated
diversiﬁcation and vice versa. The minimum value of zero corresponds to undiversiﬁed ﬁrms, operating in
only one four-digit ISIC industry.
13 Supporting this claim, Jiang et al. (2011) found an intermediate model for Chinese listed ﬁrms – that is, the
level of relatedness negatively correlates with ﬁrm performance. However, their ﬁndings are limited to only
227 Chinese listed ﬁrms which are normally large, and cannot represent a vast majority of the ﬁrm population,
which is normally small and micro sized in transition countries.
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incentive to remain within the industry and motivates it to pursue a related diversi-
ﬁcation strategy to leverage and strengthen its competitive advantage.
Table 3 lists the estimation results for both static and dynamic models. The
Hausman speciﬁcation test indicates the preference of the ROS equation over the
sales growth equation in both treatments.14 From Table 3, we can see that the coefﬁ-
cients of lagged ROS and sales growth are statistically signiﬁcant in both regres-
sions, which indicates the superiority of the dynamic model with the endogenous
treatment of the diversiﬁcation index. Other speciﬁcations will be considered for
benchmark purposes. It is plausible that ROS has a signiﬁcant lag effect because
ﬁrms’ investment decisions in one year are contingent on their investment returns
in previous years. With both ROS as the measure of proﬁtability and growth of sales
as the measure of sales performance, we ﬁnd a consistent positive relationship
between entropy index and ﬁrm performance. Generally, greater diversiﬁcation
increases ﬁrm-level proﬁtability. In other words, positive effects occur as ﬁrms move
from a single-business strategy to a diversiﬁcation strategy. However, the signiﬁcant
parameters of the square of the entropy index indicate the nonlinear inﬂuence of
diversiﬁcation: the positive effects of diversiﬁcation fall gradually as the ﬁrm moves
further and further away from its core business. These ﬁndings support our hypoth-
esis and are consistent with other comparable studies (c.f. Palich et al., 2000).
Based on previous evidence, Palich et al. (2000) conclude that performance
increases as ﬁrms move from single-business strategies to low-scaled diversiﬁcation,
but that the effect deteriorates as ﬁrms move away from the low end of related
diversiﬁcation to the high end of unrelated diversiﬁcation. As Qian (1997) suggests,
the relative costs and beneﬁts of product diversiﬁcation are likely to depend on how
the different business activities of a ﬁrm are related to each other. If they are loosely
linked or poorly structured, they are less likely to complement or supplement each
other, and hence, synergy will not exist.
The proﬁtability of a ﬁrm can be accelerated by increasing its innovative capabil-
ities through its technical labour force and innovation investment. According to
resource-based theory, a manufacturing ﬁrm’s technical resources and innovative
capabilities are valuable assets for its survival and growth. Thus, it is not surprising
that both technological resources and innovation intensity (investment in innovation
activities over the total annual investment) of a ﬁrm have a strong positive effect on
its proﬁtability. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly convex relationship between ﬁrm size and
investment return. Larger ﬁrms realise lower returns on sales than smaller ones. The
owners of large ﬁrms tend to face more challenges in allocating resources efﬁciently.
It is worth noting that the majority of the total assets of ﬁrms in Vietnam are ﬁxed
assets, including land, machinery and equipment. Their ‘asset speciﬁcity’ makes
transferability to other business sectors difﬁcult (high transaction cost) and thus
imposes a limitation on the diversiﬁcation pay-off that diversiﬁed ﬁrms can obtain.
The signiﬁcance of the quadratic coefﬁcient of economic size indicates its curvilinear
14 GMM exogenous: v2(69) = 257**; GMM endogenous: v2(71) = 857**.
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effect on performance. However, larger ﬁrms (in terms of labour size) realise higher
sales growth than their smaller counterparts. While indebted ﬁrms and capital-in-
tensive ﬁrms have lower proﬁtability, export ﬁrms outperform their counterparts.
Regarding the effect of control variables, although private ﬁrms and limited lia-
bility ﬁrms are far more proﬁtable than their state-owned counterparts, they under-
perform in terms of sales growth. Finally, ﬁrms located in growing industries of
increasing proﬁtability and competition among competitors of similar size are able
to reap more surplus value from their products and services.
6. Controlling for potential survival bias
This section takes into account the potential survival bias during and after engaging
in diversiﬁcation activities (Table 4). If diversiﬁed ﬁrms are less likely to survive
and hence exit the market more easily than other ﬁrms, we would overestimate the
economic value of diversiﬁcation because our sample only accounts for ﬁrms that
were established before 2002 and were still surviving in 2010. As our data cover the
entire population of ﬁrms in Vietnam, non-random data collection is not a cause for
concern. Any ﬁrm that fails to appear in the next-year survey can be assumed to
have gone bankrupt or to have been acquired by another ﬁrm.15 In this section, we
aim to address (i) whether ﬁrms engaging in diversiﬁcation activities are more likely
to exit the market, and (ii) whether the surviving diversiﬁed ﬁrms have higher proﬁt
margins than other ﬁrms, which is consistent with the ﬁnding above. We still apply
the Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) model to control for both ﬁrm survival and
the endogeneity of the diversiﬁcation degree for the entire ﬁrm population in Viet-
nam from 2002 to 2010 (more than a million observations). We use industry size dis-
persion and entry rate as the exclusion restrictions in the Heckman selection model.
The signiﬁcant Mills ratio k^ indicates the presence of survival bias in the whole
ﬁrm population at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level. Thus, our estimation results
above with the 9-year balance panel sample might have overestimated the economic
value of diversiﬁcation. Nevertheless, looking through the estimation from the two
stages (survival and performance), we found consistency in the patterns of results.
Some noteworthy ﬁndings include the following: ﬁrst, diversiﬁcation not only stim-
ulates ﬁrm proﬁtability signiﬁcantly but is also critical for ﬁrm survival. Firms oper-
ating in multi-related business sectors are less likely to exit the market than other
ﬁrms. Second, stronger technological resources, proxied by the interaction between
the rate of technical personnel and innovation intensity, cannot help ﬁrms to prevent
the risk of bankruptcy but do stimulate their proﬁtability once they are able to sur-
vive. Third, while innovative ﬁrms (with high innovation intensity) are more likely
to survive and generate higher proﬁt, highly leveraged ﬁrms have higher failure
rates and lower proﬁt margins. Fourth, although ﬁrms with heavy investment in
15 Unfortunately, we cannot control for the latter possibility with our current dataset.
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marketing activities have a higher propensity for survival, they appear to be less
proﬁtable given their high sunk costs. Fifth, we found statistical evidence to support
the positive relationship between a ﬁrm’s size and age and its survival probability.
However, although large incumbent ﬁrms played a crucial role in leading tech-
nological progress and regulating the emerging market in transition countries, their
dominant market position begins to be gradually taken over by their emerging pri-
vate counterparts. They are no longer proﬁtable compared to their smaller peers,
and ﬁnally, ﬁrms residing in growing industries (high average ROS) have plenty of
entrepreneurial opportunities to exploit and are, thus, more likely to survive than
those residing in mature industries which are dominated by large-sized ﬁrms. This
is also supported by the negative effect of industry size dispersion, proxied for the
maturity of industry and industry concentration.
7. Conclusions
Rather than focusing on the determinants, previous research tended to focus on the
performance outcomes of the types and degrees of diversiﬁcation activities (Doving
and Gooderham, 2008; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). Thus, despite a common consen-
sus among researchers that diversiﬁcation deploys surplus resources and cash
ﬂows, they did not account for the antecedents of resource deployment and, in turn,
of the diversiﬁcation decision. Various approaches justify divergent relationships
based on differing assumptions which converge in dealing with the conﬂicting
demands of synergies and responsiveness with respect to diversiﬁcation. The inves-
tigation of such assumptions has enabled us to understand whether diversiﬁcation
has a positive or negative effect on ﬁrm performance. The empirical results are con-
sistent with a resource- (or competence-) based view, which maintains that a posi-
tive relationship between diversiﬁcation and proﬁtability depends on the
relatedness of diversiﬁed activities. However, as the driving forces of diversiﬁcation
decisions and their proﬁtable pay-offs are resources or prior competences, it is still
not clear which factors determine ﬁrms’ decisions to diversify and to what degree.
This paper pioneers the investigation of ﬁrm diversiﬁcation in a transition coun-
try in three interrelated and consecutive stages: decision, degree and outcome. Con-
trolling for individual-level, ﬁrm-level and industry-level characteristics, we ﬁnd
that the factors stimulating ﬁrms to undertake diversiﬁcation decisions do not neces-
sarily inﬂuence their diversiﬁcation degree in the same direction and to the same
magnitude. The following are some of the main ﬁndings:
(i) Diversiﬁcation has a curvilinear effect on ﬁrm-level proﬁtability: product
diversiﬁcation improves ﬁrms’ proﬁt up to a point, after which a further
increase in diversiﬁcation is associated with declining performance.
(ii) The impact of technical employees on ﬁrms’ diversiﬁcation activities is con-
troversial, and innovation intensity does stimulate ﬁrms to diversify and
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undertake the stable and safe related pathway. These two factors are posi-
tively associated with ﬁrm performance.
(iii) Firms with higher debt ratios are less diversiﬁed; however, once they diver-
sify, they are more likely to adopt risky unrelated options, thereby leading
to lower proﬁtability.
(iv) Less diversiﬁed ﬁrms spend more and beneﬁt more from marketing invest-
ment. Marketing-intensive ﬁrms are generally more focused on their main
business ﬁelds.
(v) Newer and larger ﬁrms are more likely to engage in diversiﬁcation.
(vi) Low industry proﬁtability and highly concentrated and mature industries
signiﬁcantly stimulate ﬁrms to diversify into other business sectors and do
have a signiﬁcant impact on their overall performance.
We take into account the sample selection and endogeneity issues from cor-
related disturbances by applying different parametric and semi-parametric esti-
mation methods for both static and dynamic treatments of ﬁrm-level panel
data. Initially, sample selectivity will be tested and corrected by four estimation
approaches: the standard Heckman’s two-stage method; the Vella (1998) and
Wooldridge (1995) parametric approach; the Semykina and Wooldridge (2010)
model, correcting for both endogeneity and selectivity; and the Heckman et al.
(1998) kernel-based matching in a binary choice selection equation. Conditional
on a ﬁrm’s diversiﬁcation decision, we observe its diversiﬁcation degree (the
extent of relatedness to the ﬁrm’s core business) and its subsequent proﬁtabil-
ity. Then endogeneity of diversiﬁcation degree is controlled by the IV-GMM
and Blundell and Bond (1998) difference GMM estimation approach for both
static and dynamic treatment. We perform our analysis on the dataset of the
whole population of ﬁrms in Vietnam.
From a policy perspective, it is important to ascertain the level and degree of
product diversiﬁcation. SMEs with limited resources to sustain large-scale R&D
operations might need support for adopting a ‘deep niche’ strategy by concentrating
resources on a few specialized products and services (Qian, 2002, p. 612). Large
ﬁrms with complex multidivisional structures might need to rely on highly skilled
workers or managerial competences to overcome those constraints in terms of
organizational efﬁciency and corporate governance, which represent the primary
challenge impeding ﬁrms’ diversiﬁcation degree or product scope.
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Appendix C.
Robustness check: excluding the 2007–2010 period
Variables ROS Growth of sales
GMM exogenous† GMM endogenous‡ GMM exogenous† GMM endogenous‡
ROS t1 / Growth of sales t1 0.474** (0.045) 0.046** (0.015) 0.014* (0.007) 0.098** (0.013)
Entropy 0.257* (0.185) 1.886* (0.861) 0.197** (0.011) 1.711** (0.551)
Entropy t1 0.647 (0.739) 0.736* (0.361)
Entropy squared 0.981 (1.224) 1.134* (0.491) 0.305** (0.014) 1.676** (0.416)
Entropy squared t1 0.176 (0.29) 0.612** (0.221)
Technological resources t1 0.772 (0.612) 1.499* (0.631) 0.099 (0.241) 0.125 (0.335)
Innovation intensity t1 0.287 (0.139) 0.651* (0.288) 0.000 (0.001) 0.0004 (0.001)
Innovation intensity squared t1 0.000(0.000) 0.001 (0.003) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Tech.resources 9 innov.intensity t1 0.343 (0.389) 0.693* (0.203) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.007)
Marketing expenditure t1 0.000* (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000)
Leverage (debt ratio) t1 3.127** (0.663) 2.218** (0.769) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002)
Capital intensity 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000)
Export Y/N t1 0.381 (0.372) 0.718* (0.323) 0.006** (0.002) 0.009** (0.003)
Competition level 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
Firm age 0.279 (0.324) 0.053* (0.018) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Economic size 4.492** (0.788) 3.244* (1.451) 0.062** (0.005) 0.068** (0.007)
Economic size squared 0.420** (0.051) 2.366** (0.096) 0.004** (0.000) 0.005** (0.000)
Labour size 1.448** (0.676) 5.789** (1.232) 0.008 (0.004) 0.002 (0.007)
Labour size squared 0.551* (0.269) 0.823** (0.227) 0.001* (0.000) 0.001 (0.001)
Industry dispersion 0.001 (0.008) 0.003 (0.004) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000)
Average industry ROS 0.895 (1.621) 0.546* (0.246) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.01)
Industry concentration 0.274 (1.813) 1.934 (1.659) 0.008 (0.005) 0.003 (0.008)
Ownership types v2(5) = 123** v2(5) = 245** v2(5) = 117.92** v2(5) = 74.03**
Provincial dummies v2(32) = 136.5** v2(44) = 1,387** v2(32) = 450.8** v2(44) = 2,471**
Intercept 3.144* (1.592) 1.159 (2.123) 1.38** (0.111) 0.711** (0.115)
Wald v2 v2(69) = 878,088** v2(71) = 21,300,000** v2(69) = 329,258** v2(71) = 164,969**
Notes: **Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level; *signiﬁcant at 5 percent level; standard errors in parentheses. Observa-
tions: 104,987.
†The Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond linear dynamic GMM estimator assumes that all explanatory variables,
apart from the lagged-dependent variable, are exogenous; robust standard errors are used.
‡The Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond linear dynamic GMM estimator assumes that the diversiﬁcation index
and lagged-dependent variable are endogenous; robust standard errors are used.
The 2007–2010 period stands for not only Vietnam’s WTO membership, but also the global ﬁnancial crisis’s
contagion to Vietnam. The results despite being less signiﬁcant show consistent ﬁndings with the previous
full-sample 9-year regression (Table 3).
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